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Introduction  
There has long been a school of thought that derides the idea of peace 
implementation, of nation building, of democratisation, call it what you will, as the 
worst sort of international fad, social work and busy bodied do-gooderism - Hackney 
Council on global scale. 
It is they say, a hopeless task, beloved of naïve idealists, incapable of adapting to 
hugely difficult and different political and cultural situations, while invariably 
exhibiting a voracious appetite for taxpayers' money and a nostalgia for by-gone 
imperialism; all of which can end up exacting a heavy cost not just in treasure, but in 
human lives. 
To those who subscribe to this view, the daily news reports from Iraq provide a ready 
supply of grist to their mill. Acres of newsprint have been devoted to explaining how 
it's all a disaster, and one which could and should have been predicted. They forget 
that they said the same about Bosnia after Dayton. 
I cannot comment in any detail on the situation in Iraq. I haven't been there. I cannot 
claim a first-hand knowledge of the situation there, beyond the news and occasional 
conversations with those who are there. 
While I suspect that there is a at least some disjuncture between the impression we get 
from the media, and what every day life actually feels like on the ground, there is no 
denying that, six months on from the ousting of the Saddam regime, the situation 
facing our counterparts there remains - to put it mildly - difficult and challenging. But 
again, the same was true for Bosnia in the first six months. 
While much has been written about Iraq, there has been comparatively little 
discussion of the lessons that can be learnt - and perhaps transferred - from those 
places where the international community has been working on all of these tasks for 
some time. 
 
I'd be the first to argue that the most important lesson we can learn from Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Iraq is that each situation is different, and requires 
different solutions. But there are some things that are necessary for success in all 
these efforts. 
Time is one. Nobody is calling for one-year mandates for the peacekeepers to finish 
their job, like we did in Bosnia in 1995. 
Money is another. Rebuilding nations shattered by war or decades of misrule is 
expensive, even when you have oil. 
Determination and the ability to act robustly is a third. The divided and bureaucratic 
command and control arrangements for UN military action during the Bosnia war 
were a disaster; the Americans have been right ever since to demand a single, robust, 
chain of command for international military missions. 
Prioritising the establishment of the rule of law and restarting the economy is a fourth. 
Without a functioning judiciary and police, democracy and investment will not take 
root. Without a functioning economy, social unrest is likely to grow into chaos. 
These conclusions are rarely now disputed. They are part of what we could call the 
"nation building" consensus. 
But I would like today to argue that three other conditions are essential for success. 
First, legitimacy: an agreed plan of what we are trying to do, that has both 
international and domestic support. 
Second, regional stability: lasting and successful reconstruction is harder in a bad 
neighbourhood. 
And third, a destination. A vision of what a country can become that can motivate its 
people to make the sacrifices necessary to undertake the reforms that will prevent the 
past from returning. 
More on these later. 
Let me turn first to where we've got to in Bosnia and Hezegovina. 
It is true that watching Bosnia's progress is a bit like watching grass grow. You have 
to go away and come back at decent intervals to notice it. 
But then consider that it is only eight short years since the trauma of that war; the 
225,000 killed and the 2 million driven from their homes. And you realise that it is a 
little short of miraculous how much has been achieved; how much has changed. 
Just think: 
Eight years ago, Bosnia, torn apart by nationalism had been left shattered and near 
fatally wounded by a five year war in which a quarter of a million of its four million 
population lay dead and its nationhood, a matter of barter between Milosevic and 
Tudjman. Today Serbia and Croatia are focused, not on territorial expansion, but on 
European integration. 
Then, it would have been unthinkable to travel freely and safely all over the country. 
Now it is taken for granted. 
Then, 65% of the housing stock was heavily damaged. Today the bulk of it has been 
repaired and most of it re-occupied. 
Then, Bosnia was in economic turmoil, with no universally accepted currency. We 
now have a central bank, a stable currency and one of the lowest inflation rates in the 
Balkans. 
And, perhaps the greatest miracle of all, a million of those burnt, raped and brutalised 
from their homes have now returned to live again in the communities from which they 
were driven on a few short years ago. 
Slowly but surely, Bosnia is becoming a 'normal' country, and, increasingly, the 
challenges it is facing are 'normal' challenges - the familiar issues of transition that 
Hungary and Poland and the new democracies of Eastern Europe have already dealt 
with. 
Major reforms in these areas too are now underway. 
Bosnia is at last merging its divided and inefficient Customs and Excise system and 
setting up a single state-wide system of VAT. 
We are now tackling the big, structural and supply side reforms that all transition 
countries have had to tackle, from labour market reform to privatisation, from 
bankruptcy to public administration reform. 
And we have, just two weeks ago, seen a package of defence reforms passed that 
creates a State level Ministry of Defence, puts the military under a single Command 
and Control structure. The two armies that faced each other at the end of the war - the 
Bosnian Serb army, and the Croat-Bosnjak coalition - will now, finally, have to work 
together. 
Soldiers, border guards, customs officers, policemen, tax collectors, central bankers, 
secret service agents. All are, or very shortly will be in the employ of the State of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
Eight years ago, none of them were. 
Bosnia is now looking more and more like a State capable of joining Euro-Atlantic 
structures. 
And Brussels seems increasingly convinced too. 
Last month, the European Commission issued a broadly positive response to Bosnia's 
European Feasibility Study, summarised by Chris Patten as a "Yes but" - yes Bosnia 
can move towards formal negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
in the latter half of next year. But first it must demonstrate real progress on a discrete 
number of key reforms. Bosnia has cleared the first hurdle of the European integration 
process. 
And just last week, NATO too issued what amounts to a conditional offer of its own - 
that depending on Bosnia's progress in implementing defence reforms and 
cooperating with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, the Alliance would like to 
invite Bosnia to join Partnership for Peace at its Summit in Istanbul next June. Those 
are important conditions: but now it's up to BiH to honour them. 
Together, these announcements represent a key moment for Bosnia. 
The moment when it stands on the point of earning for itself the chance to move 
decisively from post conflict politicking, to serious, pre-accession planning. 
To move from issues of physical security and physical reconstruction, to those of 
economic reform and structural change. 
In short, the chance to move out of the era of Dayton, and into the era of Brussels. 
If that can be achieved, then far from being a failure, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be 
the first successful stabilisation project of our times. 
The battle against the forces of disintegration in Bosnia will have been won, and a 
future for this most tragic of countries finally secured. 
Should that happen, should Bosnia be able to join NATO's Partnership for Peace next 
May and earn the go ahead to open negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the European Union later in the year, the consequences for the 
international mission - and for Bosnia's Governments, Parliaments, and Institutions 
will be far reaching and profound. 
For, as the pull of the Euro-Atlantic institutions gradually replaces the push of the 
High Representative's emergency powers, so we will be able, progressively, to restore 
full authority and responsibility for decision-taking to the Bosnian authorities. 
Lessons for elsewhere? 
My biggest worries today, as the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are 
the parlous state of the economy and whether the country will one day be able to join 
the European Union. These are serious issues. We could see rising social unrest next 
year. And while I do not believe the people of Bosnia will return to ethnic conflict, I 
cannot predict what would happen if the economy spirals and the hope of Europe 
were ever to be denied them. 
But these issues themselves highlight how far the country has come. 
In the winter of 1995, Bosnians still lived in fear of their lives. In the winter of 2003, 
they live in fear of their livelihoods, but no longer in fear of their lives. 
We haven't finished our work in Bosnia, far from it. But nor are we starting from 
scratch. 
So what, then, are the lessons that one might venture to draw, on the basis of our 
experience to date in Bosnia, for this new growth area in the world's diplomatic and 
military activity, peace stabilisation? 
It's worth reflecting on this point. 
Because while we have been become good, very good, at winning the sharp, short hi 
tech wars of the last two decades -we can now do it almost by numbers -we are far 
less good at the hard, patient, resource-consuming task of building the peace that 
follows. At winning what Kipling called "The savage war of peace". 
But we need to learn and master this skill. 
Because it looks very likely that building peace after war is going to be a crucial part 
of the work of our diplomats and soldiers in the decades ahead. 
Now, let me reiterate the point I made at the start of this speech. 
No two situations are the same. 
We need to be as wary of trying to build the last peace as we should be of fighting the 
last war. 
Bosnia is not Iraq. 
Indeed, on the face of it, the differences are perhaps rather more obvious than the 
similarities. 
Iraq is over ten times bigger. 
There the war lasted less than 4 weeks; in Bosnia it lasted 4 years. 
Bosnia, rich in natural beauty, has never been rich in natural resources. Iraq sits on a 
mountain of debt. But it also possesses the second largest oil reserves in the world. 
I could go on. The point is, the differences are striking. 
But it already seems clear from the experience of the last six months in Iraq that there 
are some familiar elements from the international community's experience not just in 
Bosnia, but also in Kosovo, in East Timor, in Sierra Leone and in Afghanistan. 
This in turn suggests that there may well be some broad lessons worth considering. 
Principles for peace-making 
Earlier this year, shortly after Baghdad fell, I spoke about the seven pillars of peace 
making that could be said to apply more or less universally. I believe these have, more 
or less, survived the experience of the last six months in Iraq. 
The first is the importance of having a good plan and sticking to it. This needs to be 
drawn up, not as an after-thought to the fighting, but as an integral part of the war 
planning for the military campaign. Because the process of peace building begins in 
the first second after the midnight hour when the war ends. As Clausewitz implied 
when he said that war was the extension of politics by other means; the opposite is 
also true, the politics continues, and resumes in earnest again the moment the war 
ends. One runs into the other - and the process needs to be seamless. 
This means a change to how the military and the politicians have to think and act. 
The most difficult change will be for the military, trained as so many of the world's 
armies have been, for total war and nothing less. 
The second principle is the over-riding priority, as we have discovered in Bosnia, in 
Kosovo, in Afghanistan and now Iraq, of establishing the rule of law - and doing so as 
quickly as possible. 
Crime and corruption follow swiftly in the footsteps of war, like a deadly virus. And 
if the rule of law is not established very swiftly, it does not take long before 
criminality infects every corner of its host, siphoning off the funds for re-construction, 
obstructing the process of stabilisation and corrupting every attempt to create decent 
government and a healthy civil society. 
This, above all was the mistake we made in Bosnia. We took six years to understand 
that the rule of law should have been the first thing. We are paying the price for that 
still. 
The third lesson is that it is vital to go in with the authority you need from the start. 
On the military side, that means establishing credibility straight away. The more 
effectively a peacekeeping force copes with early challenges, the fewer challenges 
there will be in the future. 
On the civilian side, this means starting off with the powers needed to get the job 
done, rather than having to acquire them later, as we did in Bosnia to our cost. 
The fourth principle is that it is vital to start as quickly as possible on the major 
structural reforms - from putting in place a customs service or reliable tax base, to 
reforming the police and the civil service, to restructuring and screening the judiciary, 
to transforming the armed forces, and above all to pushing through the structural 
changes that will restart the economy. Long-term success always depends on these 
fundamental reforms: the sooner they are embarked upon, the sooner the job will be 
completed. 
It is vital - and this is my fifth principle - that the international community organizes 
itself in theatre in a manner that enables it to move fast and take decisions. You can't 
re-build war torn countries by committee, or by remote control from several thousand 
miles away. It has to be done by the people on the ground, and they have to be 
empowered - and trusted - to drive the process forward. 
Then there is the question of the breadth of the international effort. As the Prime 
Minister noted in his speech at Mansion House, one supremely powerful nation or a 
small group in concert can win a war. But it takes many nations to win the peace, 
working in partnership with the many international agencies, NGOs and other groups 
that have played such a significant role in Bosnia and elsewhere. And it is vital - 
repeat vital - that the international agencies speak with a single voice, and use the 
diplomatic 'sticks and carrots' available to them in a co-ordinated and determined way. 
In Bosnia, at least, the tactical use of targeted conditionality is crucial to delivering 
results. 
The sixth principle is the importance of an exceptionally close relationship between 
the military and civilian aspects of peace implementation. Civilians depend on the 
military if they are to succeed. But the military depend on the civilians too if they are 
to succeed - witness Iraq: both need each other's leverage and each other's skills. 
The final lesson I set out earlier this year is perhaps the most important of them all. 
Indeed it ought not to be a surprise to us at all, since it proved the case after the World 
War II with the Marshall Plan, and it has proved the case in every major conflict 
since. 
Building things up takes much longer than knocking them down. 
That is true - literally true - of buildings, of homes, of bridges, of power stations. 
Building the hardware of the state, its institutions - of professional police forces, of 
independent judiciaries, of courts, of civil services, of legislatures and executives, of 
free and responsible broadcasters and newspapers - all these can be done relatively 
quickly - in a matter of a year or two. 
But changing the software of the state, the minds of its citizens, takes a very long time 
indeed. Just look at Northern Ireland. It can take even longer to develop - or allow to 
develop, because these things cannot be imposed from above - especially the civil 
society that every healthy state needs, and we take so much for granted. 
The conclusion is obvious. Winning the high tech war may take weeks. But winning 
the peace that follows is measured in decades. It just cannot be done - as we initially 
claimed in Bosnia - in a year or so. So we need to avoid deadlines, and settle in for the 
long haul. 
That means staying on, and sticking at it, long after the CNN effect has passed. 
I think these principles have withstood the raging debate, about what's going on in 
Iraq and what we should be doing, relatively well. But I no longer think they tell the 
whole story. 
As I said at the start of this speech, I believe there are three other factors that are 
necessary for the success of post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia. I believe these also 
apply to Kosovo, Afghanistan and even Iraq, but I leave that for others to judge. 
The first factor is legitimacy. Or put another way, agreement on what we are trying to 
rebuild, or is most of these countries, build for the first time. Not only amongst the 
key nations and international agencies I referred to earlier, whose participation is vital 
for success. But even more crucially, amongst the people and the political, economic 
and social leaders of the country we are trying to assist. Post-war reconstruction is the 
most collective of all enterprises. For success, everyone needs to agree and work off 
the same architectural plans. 
In Bosnia, we have the Dayton Peace Agreement. It is fashionable now to say that it is 
out-of-date, has become a straight-jacket, needs to evolve. That may be true. But what 
I do know for certain is that the enormous progress Bosnia has made since 1995 
would not have been possible without it. It has provided the agreed plan for rebuilding 
Bosnia. Agreed by the international community, whose leading members signed it. 
And agreed by the Bosnians as the basis for ending the war. It provided the legitimacy 
for international engagement and the basis for our partnership with Bosnia's domestic 
politicians and institutions. 
The second factor is regional stability. I am now confident today that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will survive as a state, albeit not a centralised one of classic European 
tradition - more Belgium, probably, than France. The question that remains to be 
answered, however, is how fast will it undertake the transformation necessary to join 
the European Union. But I am confident of that, because South East Europe is not 
what it was. Tudjman is gone. Croatia's ambitions are now focused on Brussels, not 
Bosnia. Milosevic is in The Hague, overthrown by a democratic revolution. It is fair 
to say that the plans for Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, which so threatened 
Bosnia's very existence at the start of the 1990s, are dead. 
And the third factor is a destination. That's more than just an agreed framework for 
reconstruction. It is a goal that can motivate the people of war-torn countries to make 
the sacrifices necessary to transform their societies, their economies, their political 
systems, in a way that lasts. Bosnia has a clear destination. Its called Europe. People 
in Banja Luka or Siroki Brijeg may not know what the acquis communitaire means. 
But they know and believe that Europe means stability, visa free travel, prosperity, 
and the best guarantee that history will not repeat itself. The hope of getting into 
NATO and the EU has now become the main driving force of reform in Bosnia, 
replacing the executive powers of the international community. 
 
Conclusion 
We live today in a world more insecure and whose prospects are more uncertain than 
at any time in my lifetime. 
The two years and three months since September 11, 2001 have taught us a great deal. 
We are learning to live with the new reality that the menace of global terrorism has 
brought to us. 
One of the foremost of those lessons is surely that in this small and inter-connected 
world, we cannot afford to ignore failed or failing states, because what happens in 
them can pose a grave threat to our own security and our own well-being. 
Perhaps that is not such a surprising lesson. We know from our own history what can 
happen when we ignore what happens in far off countries, of which we claim to know 
little. 
In today's world, it is not for altruistic reasons - or not only for altruistic reasons - that 
we must work actively to spread stability, entrench the rule of law, and help 
communities ravaged by conflict to pick up the pieces and build a better future. This 
is not a matter of soft- headed idealism, but of hard-headed pursuit of our own 
interests and our own security. 
Some may find that a sombre, even gloomy note on which to end. But it is not 
intended to be so. 
Because we have been doing just that in Bosnia all these years, and we have been 
succeeding. What has happened in Bosnia should offer us hope - hope that it is 
possible to build from the ashes, hope that it is possible to overcome, by working 
together, apparently insuperable obstacles, and to deliver a happier future. 
Our task there is not yet done. 
We owe it not just to Bosnians, not just to ourselves, but to the world to see it through 
to permanent success. 
